Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 32: Clear-text logging of sensitive information#57
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Potential fix for https://github.com/TeaEntityLab/teaAgent/security/code-scanning/32
General fix: provide a sanitized serialization path that excludes sensitive fields at the source (data model serialization), then use that for user-facing/loggable output. This avoids relying only on sink-side masking and helps static analyzers prove safety.
Best single fix without changing functionality:
teaagent/mcp_trust.pyto add a non-sensitive serializer method onMCPTrustPolicy(e.g.,to_public_dict) that omitstrusted(and keeps existing non-sensitive structure).teaagent/cli/_handlers/_mcp_trust.pyto callpolicy.to_public_dict()instead ofpolicy.to_dict()in CLI print payloads (list,inspectfallback,allow,deny)._print_jsonmasking logic unchanged; this remains defense-in-depth.This addresses both variants by removing
trustedfrom the serialized object that reachesjson.dumpsin CLI handlers.Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.